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Abstract: In this essay on Paul Schrader, I take seriously Theodor Adorno’s claim 
that the ęlm industry is internally antagonistic, thus containing the antidote to 
its own lie. I argue that Schrader’s ęlms are ideally placed, within contemporary 
mass-produced cinema, to reveal the inherent contradiction and self-sabotaging 
of the ęlm commodity. Precisely on account of its formal tendency to endorse its 
commodity status, while aempting to subvert it from within, Schrader’s auteur-
ial cinema manages to produce symptomatic signięcations that reach beyond the 
director’s conscious narrative control. As a rule, Schrader’s mindful emphasis 
on subjective despair and self-destructiveness redoubles into the partially dis-
avowed denotation of an increasingly substanceless socio-historical constellation 
seemingly destined to implosion. The focus of this essay rests on the dialectical 
claim that subjective negativity in Schrader’s ęlms is strictly correlated to the 
theme of the decomposition of contemporary society. Schrader’s world is from 
the beginning populated by characters whose personal crises are rooted in the 
loss of symbolic eĜciency of their social environment.
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as a means to capture the negative ontology of the modern subject. Alongside 
psychoanalysis, he is interested in Hegelian dialectics as a mode of thinking 
crisis; ęlm as a prominent form of dialectical thinking; and ideology critique 
as a way to address unconscious or disavowed aachments to social forma-
tions. He is co-director of the Centre for Ideology Critique and Žižek Studies 
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1. Adorno, critical theory and the ęlm commodity
In his 1966 essay “Transparencies on Film”, arguably his most consis-tent critical incursion into the seventh art, Theodor Adorno vied for 
a cinematic avant-garde not supported “by the power of capital, tech-
nological routine and highly trained specialists”.2 Such cinema would 
privilege anti-realistic awkwardness, improvisation,3 and more general-
ly a subjective representation of the world that would solicit unconscious 
conĚicts and contradictions: “As the objectifying recreation of this type 
of experience, ęlm may become art”.4 To exemplify his stance, Adorno 
mentioned Alexander Kluge, Michelangelo Antonioni, and experimental 
ęlmmaker/composer Mauricio Kagel.5 However, despite the above rec-
ommendations, he concluded his essay on a (typically) pessimistic note, 
highlighting the impossibility for cinema to carry “purely aesthetic val-
ues” due to its inherently objective character: “The photographic process of 
ęlm, primarily representational, places a higher intrinsic signięcance on 
the object, as foreign to subjectivity, than aesthetically autonomous tech-
2 T. Adorno, The Culture Industry (London and New York: Routledge), 2001, p. 178.
3 Adorno places his stakes in a “comparatively awkward and unprofessional 
cinema, uncertain of its eěects” since there “is inscribed the hope that the 
so-called mass media might eventually become something qualitatively dif-
ferent.” He adds that “works which have not completely mastered their tech-
nique, conveying as a result something consolingly uncontrolled and acci-
dental, have a liberating quality.” And again, liquidating realism: “Film [...] 
must search for other means of conveying immediacy: improvization which 
systematically surrenders itself to unguided chance should rank high among 
possible alternatives” (Ibid., pp. 178-79).
4 Ibid., p. 180.
5 In ‘Transparencies on Film‘, Adorno ęrst praised the un-cinematic aspects of 
Antonioni’s La noe (1962) and then, returning to the central concern of his 
book with Hanns Eisler (Composing for the Films, ęrst published in 1947), sug-
gested how “ęlm’s most promising potential lies in its interaction with other 
media, themselves merging into ęlm, such as certain kinds of music. One of 
the most powerful examples of such interaction is the television ęlm Antithese
by composer Mauricio Kagel” (Ibid., p. 183).
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niques; this is the retarding aspect of ęlm in the historical process of art”.6
Through these views, Adorno expressed his rejection of mimetic realism 
and its presumed objectivity. Back in 1934, after visiting the Babelsberg 
studios in Potsdam, he had wrien to Walter Benjamin that “reality is 
always constructed with an infantile aachment to the mimetic and then 
‘photographed’”.7 For him, mimetic realism is in fact constitutive of the 
ęlmic medium, while its exploitation by the ęlm industry is responsible 
for the weakening of subjective imagination, expressivity and the capaci-
ty to reĚect, thereby contributing to cementing the dominant ideological 
order. This diagnosis is echoed in a well-known passage of the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment: 
“The more intensely and Ěawlessly [ęlmic] techniques dupli-
cate empirical objects, the easier it is today for the illusion to 
prevail that the outside world is the straightforward contin-
uation of that presented on screen. […] Real life is becoming 
indistinguishable from the movies. The sound ęlm, far sur-
passing the theater of illusion, leaves no room for imagination 
or reĚection on the part of the audience, who is unable to re-
spond within the structure of the ęlm, yet deviate from its pre-
cise detail without losing the thread of the story; hence the ęlm 
forces its victims to equate it directly with reality.”8
Against the defence of realism propsed by his friend Siegfried Kracau-
er (in his Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality, ęrst published 
in 1960), Adorno argued that cinema by deęnition tends to ‘conęscate 
6 Ibid., p. 181. Immediately after he claims: “That which is irreducible about the 
objects in ęlm is itself a mark of society, prior to the aesthetic realization of an 
intention. By virtue of this relationship to the object, the aesthetics of ęlm is 
thus inherently concerned with society. There can be no aesthetics of cinema, 
not even a purely technological one, which would not include the sociology 
of the cinema” (182).
7 T. Adorno and W. Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, edited by 
Henri Loni (Cambridge: Polity Press) 1999, p. 131.
8 T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London and New 
York: Verso), 1997, p. 126.
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the imaginary’. With reference to crime ęlms, for instance, he claimed 
that the representations of tragic or antisocial personalities contributed 
to assuaging or even eradicating rebellion within late-capitalist societ-
ies.9 Similarly, he rejected auteurial tendencies within the ęlm industry, 
arguing that they provide a liberal deviation within the norm, aimed at a 
devilish aĜrmation of the ideological message: “Whenever Orson Welles 
oěends against the tricks of the trade, he is forgiven because his depar-
tures from the norm are regarded as calculated mutations which serve 
all the more strongly to conęrm the validity of the system”.10 Along the 
same lines, in Composing for the Films he emphasised his dislike for “pre-
tentious grade-A ęlms” produced by the industry.11
It is worth recalling that already in 1926 Max Horkheimer had indict-
ed technology (photography, telegraphy, and the radio) for desensitising 
people, thus reducing their reĚexive capacity.12 In fact, the critique of the 
ideological triumph of instrumental rationality, in a world increasingly 
saturated with technology, is arguably the central theme in traditional 
critical theory. In this respect, the ideological purpose of ęlm in the age 
of technological reproduction was supposedly that of reconciling the 
masses with the status quo. As is well known, initially Walter Benjamin 
proposed a diěerent take on technological reproduction,13 believing in 
the subversive potential of cinema as a politicized art form capable of ex-
erting a direct inĚuence on the masses. In this and other respects, he fol-
lowed Bertolt Brecht, who, despite his personal frustrations with the ęlm 
industry,14 was also sanguine about the subversive potential of cinema. 
9 See Ibid., pp. 151-56.
10 Ibid., p. 129.
11 T. Adorno and H. Eisler, Composing for the Films (London and New York: Con-
tinuum), 2005, p. 16.
12 M. Horkheimer, Dawn & Decline: Notes 1926–1931 and 1950–1969 (New York: 
Seabury Press), 1978, p. 19.
13 See W. Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Fontana Press), 1992, pp. 211–44.
14 Brecht had been bierly disappointed by Georg W. Pabst’s 1931 ęlm version 
of his Threepenny Opera, to the extent that the disagreement between the two 
had led to a lawsuit. For a comparison of play and ęlm, see T. Elsaesser, Wei-
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Adorno and Benjamin kept disagreeing on the role of ęlm until less than 
two years prior to Benjamin’s death, when Benjamin concurred with his 
younger friend that the advent of the talkies had stiĚed the revolutionary 
potential of silent cinema.15
While Adorno’s analysis is theoretically sound and no doubt consis-
tent with avant-garde ęlmmaking, it seems to me that it risks jeisoning 
the crucial dialectical issue concerning the inherently contradictory di-
mension of the ęlm commodity. This is all the more surprising when, in 
“Transparencies on Film”, we come across the following remark:
“In its aempts to manipulate the masses the ideology of the 
culture industry itself becomes as internally antagonistic as 
the very society which it aims to control. The ideology of the 
culture industry contains the antidote to its own lie. No other 
plea could be made for its defence.”16
This is no small plea. In its radical self-reĚexivity, it is a point that 
deserves more sustained critical exploration than Adorno was prepared 
to grant it – predictably, he ended his piece by re-emphasising the reac-
tionary nature of ęlm within the culture industry, insofar as the laer “is 
not the art of the consumer but rather the projection of the will of those 
in control onto their victims.”17
My overall argument in this essay is rooted precisely in the dialec-
tical claim that the ęlm industry is internally antagonistic and thus, to 
use Adorno’s own words, it “contains the antidote to its own lie”. If, 
paraphrasing Adorno, the aim of avant-garde cinema is to break away 
mar Cinema and After: Germany’s Historical Imaginary (Oxford and New York: 
Routledge), 2004, pp. 311–29.
15 In a leer of 9 December 1938, Benjamin wrote to Adorno: “I see more and 
more clearly that the launching of the sound ęlm must be regarded as an 
operation of the ęlm industry designed to break the revolutionary primacy 
of the silent ęlm, which had produced reactions that were diĜcult to control 
and hence dangerous politically” (T. Adorno and W. Benjamin, The Complete 
Correspondence 1928-1940, p. 295).
16 T. Adorno, The Culture Industry, p. 181.
17 Ibid., p. 185.
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from the iron cage of commodięed and thus ideologically-laden enter-
tainment, one perhaps should also be aware that, in dialectical terms, the 
frontier separating ‘ideological’ and ‘non-’ or ‘extra-ideological’ is inter-
nal to ideology itself, not merely external. Precisely because linguistical-
ly structured, any symbolic and therefore ideological ęeld by deęnition 
generates its own excess, or surplus of meaning, which it struggles to 
integrate or repress within its dispositif. If there is a lesson to be learned 
from dialectical thinking, it concerns the intrinsic self-sabotaging of any 
power mechanism. Adorno’s rejection of the ęlm industry often fails to 
confront the elementary principle of dialectics, namely the imperative to 
locate antagonism not only where it is fully embraced and solicited, but 
especially where it is muted. 
In what follows, I consider the example of Paul Schrader’s cinema in 
order to discuss how the ęlm commodity today might be seen to engage 
with its self-generated contradiction. I contend that Schrader’s ęlms are 
ideally placed, within contemporary mass-produced cinema, to reveal 
the inherent self-sabotaging of the ęlm commodity. This argument is pre-
mised on the assumption that Schrader is highly representative of that 
group of contemporary directors who have to negotiate the stiĚing com-
mercial rationale of the ęlm industry while also challenging it from with-
in. The result are ęlms that consciously explore, and expose, their own 
contradictory nature from within their commodity form. While they never 
really overcome their commercial imprimatur, they display a high degree 
of self-awareness, which lends them a distinctive auteurial and to an extent 
iconoclastic quality. As a ęlm critic as well as a scriptwriter and director, 
Schrader is arguably the epitome of the self-conscious contemporary ęlm-
maker, which is probably why his work has remained at the margins of 
the critical debate: in a way, his ęlms already contain their own critique. 
As a contemporary auteur, Schrader is certainly not alone, although 
one would be hard-pressed to ęnd other ęlmmakers who are more obsti-
nately conĚictual in their relationship with the ęlm industry.18 The focus 
18 Schrader played a signięcant role within the so-called ‘New Hollywood’ 
or ‘American New Wave’ (late 1970s and early 1980s), which included also 
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of this essay, however, lies in the claim that to get more ‘critical joy’ out 
of Schrader’s auteurial stance, the emphasis should be placed less on the 
consciously recalcitrant side of his ęlmmaking than on his partly dis-
avowed allegiance with mainstream cinema. Precisely on account of its 
formal tendency to accept its status as a ęlmic commodity, Schrader’s 
cinema produces symptomatic signięcations that challenge the director’s 
aesthetic and narrative control of the ęlms. I claim that what is antago-
nistic in Schrader’s work is best explained by reference to the elementary 
Hegelian dialectic of subject and substance.19 If as a rule Schrader explicitly 
immerses his characters in an atmosphere of existential despair that they 
are unable to transcend, this subjective condition redoubles into the rep-
resentation of an increasingly substanceless socio-historical microcosm, 
seemingly destined to self-annihilation. Thus, the mindful emphasis on 
subjective negativity tends to obfuscate this cinema’s denotation of the 
‘self-contraction of substance’ – the increasing loss of symbolic eĜciency 
of our world. 
Perhaps the clearest example of this logic can be observed in the ęnal 
sequence of Aĝiction (1997), generally regarded as one of Schrader’s un-
disputed masterpieces. A hybrid between a neo-noir and a family drama, 
this ęlm focuses on Wade Whitehouse’s (Nick Nolte) journey of self-de-
Robert Altman, Brian De Palma, Martin Scorsese and Francis Ford Coppola. 
Today the list of Hollywood auteurs could be extended to the Coen Brothers, 
David Fincher, Steven Soderbergh, Christopher Nolan and Quentin Taranti-
no. For the overlap between ‘New Hollywood’ and mainstream commercial 
cinema see Jon Lewis’ “The Perfect Money Machine(s): George Lucas, Steven 
Spielberg and Auteurism in the New Hollywood”, Film International, 1 (1), 
2003, 12-26.
19 I am referring to the famous passage of the preface to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit where Hegel claims that ‘everything turns on grasping and expressing 
the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject’ (G. W. F. Hegel, Phe-
nomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1977, p. 10), insofar 
as ‘what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is 
really its doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject’ (21). By 
aĜrming the speculative identity of substance and subject, Hegel argues that 
the subject is by deęnition included within substance as its constitutive gap, 
its radical inconsistency, the empty kernel around which any socio-symbolic, 
substantial meaning or sense is erected.
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struction in a small and stagnant New Hampshire town, his profound 
sense of worthlessness being explicitly associated with the abuse suf-
fered as a child from his alcoholic father Glen (James Coburn). Following 
a recurrent theme in Schrader’s works, masculine violence in Aĝiction is 
linked to feelings of deep inadequacy, which here have a precise cause: 
an unresolved oedipal conĚict, which is what triggers Wade’s personal 
via crucis. The ęlm’s narrator Rolfe (Wade’s brother, played by Willem 
Defoe), whose voiceover opens and ends the story, makes this link ex-
plicit in the ęnal sequence: 
“Our stories, Wade’s and mine, describe the lives of boys and 
men for thousands of years, boys who were beaten by their fa-
thers, whose capacity for love and trust was crippled almost at 
birth and whose best hope, if any, for connection with other hu-
man beings lay in an elegiac detachment, as if life were over”. 
By privileging the oedipalisation of a fairly conventional subjective 
drama (the legacy of violence passed on from father to son), Schrader 
here de-emphasises the socio-symbolic ‘substance’ in the background. 
I am referring to the claustrophobic microcosm of a bleak, ęnancially 
destitute North American small town caught in a (metaphorical) winter 
freeze, where ‘new money’ from Boston is mysteriously manipulated to 
serve the interests of a few powerful people. While Wade’s subjective 
despair takes on almost universal value, as in a Greek tragedy, the dis-
integration of the small community, where human relations are literally 
frozen by the abstract and invisible rationale of economic value, is pow-
erfully aĜrmed but in a disavowed mode. It is this crucial symptomatic 
dimension of Schrader’s cinema that I intend to examine in this essay. 
Given the limited scope at my disposal, in what follows I have chosen to 
focus primarily on one Schrader’s latest works, Dog Eat Dog (2016), a ęlm 
underrated by critics and seemingly beliled by the director himself.20
20 The title of the interview to Paul Schrader appeared on The Guardian on No-
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2. The decomposing body of contemporary society
Three quarters into Dog Eat Dog, when Diesel (Christopher Mahew 
Cook) and Mad Dog (Willem Dafoe) are about to leave Mike Brennan’s 
(Louis Perez) dead body in an abandoned military base, which already 
hosts two more bodies in a state of putrefaction, the loquacious, coke-ad-
dict Mad Dog says to his slightly nauseated partner in crime: “Aw, shit, 
bro, haven’t you ever done sanitation? It’s a fuckin’ fact in forensic science 
that when things begin to rot, they’re at their least toxic for you because 
they are structurally bent on their own self-destruction”. This seemingly 
inconsequential line presents us with the key to access the partly uncon-
scious dimension of Paul Schrader’s mercurial crime-caper, a deranged, 
claustrophobic thriller almost entirely focussed on three psychopathic 
oddballs who would feature comfortably in a Tarantino ęlm, were they 
not totally wanting in coolness and dexterity. The central point is that 
Schrader works, as he has done throughout his ęlmic career, with a de-
composing body, which I claim speaks, ultimately, for the decomposing body 
of contemporary society. Of course, the body under scrutiny in Dog Eat Dog
is also, metaphorically speaking, cinema itself, inasmuch as Schrader is 
aware that technological innovation has ushered in what he calls, in ęlm-
making terms, “the post-rules generation”.21 Yet, his lucid meta-cinemat-
ic awareness, always displayed throughout his ęlmmaking career, does 
not obscure the underlying existential and, to a diěerent degree, political 
concerns that his ęlm exudes. The point is that the three ex-cons in Dog 
vember 13, 2016 reported the following quotation from the director: “I’ve 
made some important ęlms. Dog Eat Dog is not one of them”.
21 See interview in hps://www.theguardian.com/ęlm/2016/may/27/paul-
schrader-willem-dafoe-dog-eat-dog, where he further comments: “You can 
do most anything now,” he says. “You can shoot a scene in black and white, 
one in colour, one tinted and the audience will say, ‘Hey, cool.’ Animation. 
Stop–motion. We have a generation of viewers that have been rewired and 
re-educated on multimedia technology. Their brains ęre at a diěerent rate. 
When they see those movies from the 70s they think, ‘Oh my God, that’s a 
slow movie.’”
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Eat Dog, brutalised by life in prison, inept and uerly unredeemable, are 
unable to relate to anyone outside ‘the joint’, including, ultimately, each 
other. They are unable, in other words, to normalise their lives for the 
simple reason that normality itself is nowhere to be found in the outside 
world, i.e. among the cold, Ěashy, disconnected, and deadly microcosm 
of strip malls and dive bars in post-crash Cleveland – which is where 
Schrader transposes the original seing (Los Angeles) of Edward Bun-
ker’s 1995 novel of the same title. These characters’ individuality is re-
duced to its etymological root: an indivisible, atomistic self-concern with 
no room for any social relation. They are, then, contemporary versions 
of Leibniz’s monad: windowless and self-contained bundles of uncoor-
dinated libidinal drives. Their infantile regression leads them back to the 
state of “polymorphous perversity” of which Freud spoke.22
Schrader’s ęlm, and his cinema as a whole, seems to me a particularly 
powerful example of how cultural commodities today – including seem-
ingly less accomplished ęlms endorsing the hyper-fragmentary post-
rules scenario – are able to evoke reĚections on questions that our post-
modern sensitivity was hoping to have evicted forever from the arena of 
intellectual discussion. I am referring to a type of critique that, feigning 
compliance with the relativistic blackmail of our times, stubbornly holds 
on to the old Hegelian insight that socio-historical formations possess a 
dialectical substantiality, or essence, whose pervasiveness extends to all 
aspects of social life. In this respect, the dialectic should be restored to its 
original signięcation within Hegelian critical theory: not the postmod-
ern declension of a systematic theory aiming at recomposing a whole 
out of its original fragmentation, but a modality of thought acknowledg-
ing, and tarrying with, contradiction as the essential correlative feature 
of the unity of opposites. Against this understanding, postmodernism 
qua logic of late-capitalism (Fredric Jameson) – and, closer to us, of hy-
permodernity (Gilles Lipovetsky) – thrives on a staunchly anti-dialecti-
22 S. Freud, ‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis‘, in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works, Vol. XXIII (1937-1939) (London: The Hogarth 
Press), 1964.
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cal narrative, upholding irreducible individuality and the production of 
subjectivities in the name of a compulsive “desire to diěer” that provides 
a perfect ęt for our ideological regime of Ěexible production, market re-
search and hyper-individualised consumption. If postmodern thought 
and sensibility focus at best on power relations and their constructions 
or deconstructions, thus (unwiingly) re-substantialising the bourgeois 
notion of the individual qua self-entrenched, privileged observer, a ęlm 
like Schrader’s Dog Eat Dog unwiingly unravels for us the dialectical 
co-dependency of subject and ‘external’ substance, their unity being 
sanctioned by their overlapping inconsistency in a historical context tra-
versed, saturated and ęnally emptied by the mythologeme of economic 
value.
Here we should recall that Marx considered the main contradiction of 
the capitalist mode of production to reside neither in the conĚict between 
capital and workers, nor in the competition among capitalists. Rather, for 
him the key impasse concerns the relation between the social power of 
capital and society as a material entity: 
“Capital shows itself more and more to be a social power, with 
the capitalist as its functionary – a power that no longer stands 
in any possible kind of relationship to what the work of one 
particular individual can create, but an alienated social power 
which has gained an autonomous position and confronts soci-
ety as a thing, and as the power that the capitalist has through 
this thing.”23
Our historical constellation in disarray gives us the opportunity to 
reformulate what is worth saving in Karl Marx’s work: the centrepiece 
of his critique of the political economy, namely the analysis of the val-
ue-form (Wertform) assumed by our individual and collective existence 
in modern societies. The value-form is more than just money. As under-
stood by Marx, it is a social totality larger than its empirical quantięca-
23 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3 (New York: Vintage 
Books), 1981, p. 373.
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tion, an invisible and intangible network of forces and eěects that plays 
a constitutive role in the formation of our subjectivity and related social 
bond. Value, then – inasmuch as it is objectively embodied in each in-
dividual commodity – designates the historically specięc form that our 
social being takes in modernity. It originates from human labour (work) 
and manifests itself as money (price) and money-generating money (cap-
ital). As such, it constitutes the formal condition through which modern 
societies reproduce themselves.24 In Hegelian parlance, we would say 
that the value-form is the subterranean Spirit (Geist) of our times, insofar 
as it weaves itself silently into anything we do or think, sparing noth-
ing. However, precisely as a manifestation of what Hegel called Spirit, 
we should insist on the inwardly self-destructive character of the val-
ue-form: its ‘mission’ is not merely to substantialise itself qua social for-
mation, but also, conversely, to cause its own collapse by undermining 
the invisible foundations of the social structure that carries its weight. In 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the “silent, ceaseless weaving 
of the Spirit in the simple inwardness of its substance” as inextricably 
linked with Spirit’s self-relating negativity, as in the following passage 
where he quotes Diderot’s Nephew of Rameau:
“Rather, being now an invisible and imperceptible Spirit, it 
inęltrates the noble parts through and through and soon has 
taken complete possession of all the vitals and members of the 
unconscious idol; then ‘one ęne morning it gives its comrade 
a shove with the elbow, and bang! crash! the idol lies on the 
Ěoor’. On ‘one ęne morning’ whose noon is bloodless if the in-
fection has penetrated to every organ of spiritual life. Memory 
alone then still preserves the dead form of the Spirit’s previ-
ous shape as a vanished history, vanished one knows not how. 
And the new serpent of wisdom raised on high for adoration 
has in this way painlessly cast merely a withered skin.”25
24 For a detailed analysis of this, see Feldner and Vighi, 2015.
25 G. F. W. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 332.
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Contemporary capitalism’s vanishing capacity to produce econom-
ic value – an issue I will brieĚy address later in the essay – is today’s 
counterpart to Hegel’s description of the vanishing of Spirit in its specięc 
historical form. Dialectically speaking, the vanishing coincides with the 
power of its own self-causation out of nothing, since there is no outside 
to Spirit and therefore no guarantee of its ontological consistency. It is 
this vanishing as radical self-contraction of the value-form of capital that 
contemporary cinema has a chance to reĚect on by way of its specięc 
capacity to mediate the real, that is to say its particular modality of aes-
thetic sublimation. 
3. Subject is Substance: a common destiny
It might not seem particularly revealing that the dissolution of the social 
bond in Schrader’s Dog Eat Dog is represented through what is often re-
garded as the overarching feature of contemporary American cinema: 
graphic violence. However, unlike much of the spectacularisation of 
screen violence that began to characterise mainstream Hollywood since 
1968 – the year the last vestiges of the Production Code were abolished 
– Schrader’s representation of ‘ultraviolence’ works explicitly as a cin-
ematic metonymy for the self-destructiveness of the social link. In this 
respect, it is not only Dog Eat Dog’s graphic violence that maers but also 
its unencumbered and unapologetic nastiness, which is particularly pal-
pable in its display of racism and sexism. ReĚected in the ęlm’s halluci-
nated and fragmented aesthetics, the display of unmitigated viciousness 
would seem to incarnate today’s version of what Jacques Lacan called 
jouissance, the unconstrained, painful yet untranscendable pulsation of a 
libidinal aěect that pertains to the register of the Real and, as such, deęes 
symbolisation. It is in relation to its own jouissance that Dog Eat Dog pro-
vides an exemplięcation of the Hegelian theme of the speculative identi-
ty of subject and substance: the ‘world’ whose substance is the acephalous 
drive of capitalist accumulation, coincides with the psychopathic subject 
whose life is increasingly ruled by the stolid pursuit of commodięed, 
ersa enjoyment. ‘Subject’ and ‘substance’ coalesce around the identical 
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compulsion to repeat an unmediated gesture whose only aim is to per-
petuate its senseless loop. It is no surprise that, at one point, the three 
hapless criminals in Dog Eat Dog comment somewhat nostalgically about 
life in prison and its code of honour: once released back into the ‘commu-
nity’, they sense that their compulsion to ‘enjoy life’ constitutes an even 
stricter form of captivity masqueraded as freedom. 
Schrader’s most accomplished cinematic characters are by deęnition 
caught in the loop of jouissance, which, however, far from exhausting it-
self in subjective excess, dialectically illuminates the crumpling mono-
lith of our socio-symbolic life-space inasmuch as it is entirely given over 
to the self-referential and destructive Ěow of capital. In this sense, the 
cinematic subject that Schrader presents on screen is always ‘identical’ 
to the imploding social bond in which s/he dwells. We would be hard 
pressed to ęnd other directors whose cinematic inspiration is so perva-
sively dominated by this foundering dialectical link. From this angle, his 
most accomplished and intriguing characters are all variations of the par-
adigmatic ęgure of his cinema, namely Travis Bickle (Taxi Driver, 1976), 
the very incarnation of the implosion of the Hegelian dialectical ęgure 
of the subject-substance: the subject unable and obstinately unwilling to 
create enduring liaisons within ‘a world at the end of the world’, whose 
structuring principle is itself fundamentally psychopathic. Critics are 
generally aware of the death-driven character of Schrader’s heroes,26 but 
as a rule fail to grasp the speculative identity with social substance. 
Let us take Julian Kay (Richard Gere) and his hustler’s underworld in 
Schrader’s American Gigolo (1980). The hero’s cool self-assurance with-
in his Beverly Hills boutique microcosm captures a subjectivity entirely 
deęned by the value-form, down to its innermost intimacy. As a sexual 
service that can be bought and sold, Julian embodies to perfection the 
26 For instance, back in 1981 Bill Nichols wrote: “Whether in The Yazuka, Hard 
Core, Taxi Driver, Blue Collar, Obsession, Rolling Thunder, American Gigolo or 
Raging Bull the central character’s idée ęxe pushes him toward a point per-
ilously close to the bounds of sanity, a point well beyond the limits within 
which most of us choose to live” (B. Nichols, ‘American Gigolo: Transcendental 
Style and Narrative Form‘, Film Quarterly 34 (4), 1981, pp. 8-13).
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psychopathic ideology of the 1980s brave new world of neoliberal in-
dividualism, where discipline and self-control became key aributes of 
a self-made man with no time for empathy with community members. 
With Julian, in fact, it is not merely that sexuality is reduced to a business 
transaction, but more importantly that such equivalence is deliberately 
rendered as an illusion of individual freedom and even emancipation. 
The ęlm’s dénouement clearly indicates that this illusion is nothing but 
the obverse of the obscure and fundamentally self-destructive trajectory 
of the value-form in our specięc historical constellation. Despite the ęlm’s 
transcendental ęnale, where redemption from the tyranny of compulsive 
self-valorisation is linked to the possibility of love – to be intended, how-
ever, in Lacanian and therefore strictly anti-Hollywood terms, i.e. as an 
encounter between two radically inconsistent human beings –27 the nar-
rative remains deęned by negativity, that is to say by the speculative co-
incidence of the subject’s downward spiralling trajectory and the gradual 
vanishing of the socio-symbolic substance. Although in American Gigolo
Schrader would seem to explicitly endorse the transcendental paern in-
herited from his models Jasujiro Ozu, Carl Theodor Dreyer and Robert 
Bresson,28 famously quoting the ęnal scene and line of Bresson’s Pickpocket
(1959),29 his ęlm is conceived in an entirely diěerent context, and remains 
largely conditioned, also stylistically, by the contradictory nature of the 
value-form, which inęltrates every pore of its narrative. What remains 
central to American Gigolo, in line with Schrader’s ęlmography as a whole, 
is the theme of subjective self-empting, which mirrors the self-contraction of 
the socio-historical substance. Only after his self-damaging journey (Ju-
lian’s eventual debasement and psychological annihilation) can redemp-
27 Julian is framed for a murder he did not commit and ends up in jail. However, 
in the ęnal scene he is paid a visit by his lover Michelle (Lauren Huon), wife 
to a powerful politician, who tells him she has provided him with an alibi, 
sacrięcing her marriage and wealth to save him.
28 See his Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson and Dreyer (New York: Da 
Capo Press), 1988.
29 Similarly to the endings of Schrader’s later ęlms Pay Hearst (1988) and Light 
Sleeper (1992). 
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tion be entertained as a Christian alternative to the self-assertive, merci-
less logic of a world totalised by economic valorisation.
Schrader’s vision stages a psychopathic world, as such increasingly 
deprived of that protective layer of virtual density (the invisible socio-lin-
guistic ‘cover’ framing our existence) that Lacan called ‘the big Other’. In 
other words, it stages the loss of a world: the progressive depotentiation 
and dissolution of the socio-ontological processes that accompany the 
capitalist dynamic. The dominant theme is thus our civilisation’s pro-
gressive loss of ‘symbolic cover’ in the face of the shaering force of the 
economic drive over traditional religious, political or more generally 
ideological narratives (the phenomenon famously described by Karl Po-
lanyi as “disembedding”).30 It is a cinema whose trajectory goes hand in 
hand with the valorisation crisis that accompanies the global triumph of 
contemporary capitalism – a crisis that originates precisely in the 1970s. 
To put it in Jeremy Riin’s words: “What’s undermining the capital-
ist system is the dramatic success of the very operating assumptions 
that govern it. At the heart of capitalism there lies a contradiction in the 
driving mechanism that has propelled it ever upwards to commanding 
heights, but now is speeding it to its death. [...] Capitalism’s operating 
logic is designed to fail by succeeding.”31
In this respect, the transcendental character of Schrader’s cinema can 
only be posited as the outcome of the self-destructive socio-economic dy-
namic in its contemporary context. Transcendence is strictly correlative 
to an instance of embedded negativity; it is the painful cipher of this cin-
ema’s impotence in directly aspiring to an alternative social model. Qua 
impotence, transcendence registers the historical aporia of the valorisa-
tion dogma: on the one hand, this dogma misęres in practice, miserably 
failing to deliver the promised goods; on the other hand, it continues to 
30 See K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time (London: Beacon Press), 2001 [1944].
31 J. Riin, The Zero Marginal Cost Society. The Internet of Things, the Collaborative 
Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 2014, p. 
2. While I do not share Riin’s optimistic vision of the transition to a Collab-
orative Commons, his initial diagnosis is well founded.
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reign undisturbed as a system of social reproduction, as if it was deliv-
ering those goods. This aporia suggests the dominance of a particular 
type of denial, whose object is the terminal malady of our economy and, 
consequently, of our society insofar as it is pervasively deęned by the 
combustion of economic value. Capitalism’s growing inability to en-
gender economic value out of human labour, its lifeblood, on account 
of its ever-more ubiquitous reliance on automation, has been explored 
from a variety of perspectives.32 What remains largely unaccounted for is 
the specięc helplessness of our contemporary society and political class 
vis-à-vis this self-evident valorisation deadlock, inasmuch as the laer is 
positively obscured by the totalising grip of a global economic mandate 
by now fully internalised as destiny. Because the blind, self-referential 
expansion of abstract value has ęnally become what it always-already 
was, i.e. the single developmental driver of modern life, its victory is 
matched by an age-specięc aitude of perverse disavowal in relation to 
its historical impasse, which we are currently experiencing. I claim that 
contemporary cinema is one of the key sites where the specięc dialectical 
constellation in which we dwell can be critically scrutinised.
Increasingly unwilling to immunise itself against the acephalous drive 
of the capitalist mode of production, which ushers in the decay of its 
social form, Schrader’s world is from the beginning populated by char-
acters whose personal crises are rooted in the loss of symbolic eĜciency 
of the social. Already Blue Collar (1978), his directorial debut, introduced 
us to the inseparability of subject and substance by highlighting their 
‘speculative identity’ in both conĚict and crisis. Blue Collar focusses on 
the deterioration and ęnal dissolution of working class solidarity while 
also demolishing the American dream of the ‘hard work society’. From 
32 See for instance E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: NLB), 1975; R. Kurz, The 
Substance of Capital. The Life and Death of Capitalism (London: Chronos), 2016; 
J. Riin, The End of Work. The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of 
the Post-Market Era (New York: Putnam and Sons), 1995; P. Mason, Postcapi-
talism. A Guide to Our Future (London: Allen Lane), 2015; H. Feldner and F. 
Vighi, Critical Theory and the Crisis of Contemporary Capitalism (London and 
New York: Bloomsbury), 2015.
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the start, then, Schrader aims at the interconnection between the decom-
posing body of contemporary (industrial) society and the crisis of the 
individual whose identity depends on the invisible dogma of the inces-
sant valorisation of value. In this respect, his interest in pornography is 
telling, for it stems from his sensibility toward the implosive mechanisms 
characterising the universe of the value-form. As with American Gigolo, 
the theme of the economic valorisation of sexuality allows Schrader to 
confront directly the self-dissipation of human relations under the aegis 
of contemporary capital. Although underpinned by a reĚection on the 
diěerent communicative technologies that have characterised the history 
of modern cinema, which is part of Schrader’s long-standing engagement 
with ęlm history and ęlm aesthetics,33 works like Hardcore (1979, tradi-
33 Schrader’s interest in the aesthetics of cinema initially emerged with his 1972 
monograph Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, and Dryer (1988). More 
recently, he has contributed to the debate on the 'end of cinema': “Movies have 
owned the 20th century. It will not be so in the 21st century. Cultural and tech-
nological forces are at work that will change the concept of ‘movies’ as we have 
known them. I don’t know if there will be a dominant art form in this centu-
ry, and I’m not sure what form audiovisual media will take, but I am certain 
movies will never regain the prominence they enjoyed in the last century”(P. 
Schrader, ‘Canon Fodder‘, Film Comment, 2006, p. 35). He himself seeks a way 
out of the current strictures of cinematic production by using, for instance, 
crowdfunding platforms such as ‘Kickstarter’, deferred salaries, free locations 
and no costume department. In agreement with Dudley Andrew (The Image in 
Dispute) and Walter Benjamin (“The work of art in the age of mechanical repro-
duction”), Schrader summarises his point this way: “Motion pictures are but a 
way station in the cavalcade of art history, a stopover en route from 19th-centu-
ry wrien narrative to the 21st-century world of synthetic images and sounds” 
(Ibid, p. 41). More explicitly: “The future of audiovisual entertainment (I hes-
itate to use the term ‘motion pictures’) will be determined by technology. The 
technical means of capturing, producing, and distributing moving images has 
always deęned the ‘art’ in ęlm art. The nickelodeon determined a certain type 
of cinema, as did the process of projecting images across a darkened room—as 
did television. The art of audiovisual storytelling has been redeęned by every 
technological innovation: sound stage, crane, color, widescreen, high-speed 
ęlm, radio microphone, video camera, Steadicam, digital editing, digital imag-
es. The movies have never stopped morphing. Technology has deęned the art 
of ęlm as much as its social context. The current uncertainty about the nature of 
cinema—and its future—cannot be resolved by artists or ęnanciers; technology 
will accomplish that task” (Ibid, p. 42).
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tional ęlm theatres), Auto-focus (2002, TV home videos) and The Canyons 
(2013, digital revolution) are especially eloquent in oěering a declension 
of pornography within the increasingly valueless social sphere. Pornog-
raphy, then, becomes one of Schrader’s favourite metonymies to illumi-
nate the loss of symbolic eĜciency in the epoch of neoliberal capitalism, 
insofar as this loss triggers a strategy of perverse (exhibitionistic) submis-
sion to the gaze of the camera. As the virtual cover of the big Other evap-
orates, the subject’s best chance to achieve identięcation would seem to 
lie with submission to the mediatised eye. In this reading, the reĚection 
on the progressive dematerialisation of cinema (from ‘heavy’ analogical 
apparatus to ‘light’ digital platform), which self-reĚexively accompanies 
Schrader’s work, functions as an unconscious metaphorical rendition of 
his ‘dialectic of dissolution’, where the focus lies ęrmly on the self-de-
ployment of the contemporary decomposition of the substance of value.
Auto-focus (2002) is a perfect case in point of the above logic. The cru-
cial feature of Bob Crane’s pathology is not his voyeuristic accumula-
tion of pornographic material, but rather his strange desire to appear in it, 
to the extent that his arousal eventually coincides with recording and 
watching his sexual escapades rather than in simply having them. The 
term ‘auto-focus’ should be understood literally: it speaks to the subject 
focusing on its own image mediated by the ready-made technological 
eye. Within this self-reĚexive loop, sexuality provides the contempo-
rary subject with the ultimate illusion of being. How? Precisely through 
perverse self-externalisation: ‘I have sex in front of a camera, therefore I 
am’. The fundamental principle of contemporary perversion resides in 
making one’s self available for technological reproduction and sharing. 
In Auto-focus, then, Schrader captures the psychic structure that deęnes 
the contemporary subject at its historical inception. The libidinal com-
pulsion to appear in a technological image oěered up to limitless circu-
lation, which characterises the use of popular social networks such as 
Facebook and Instagram, begins with Bob Crane’s fascination with the 
possibility of watching himself in a homemade video. In this context, the 
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pornographic dimension highlighted by Schrader makes the perverse 
nature of the above aitude explicit. With the progressive evaporation of 
the virtual eye of the big Other, inaugurated by the 1968 liberation move-
ments and continuing throughout the ‘post-ideological’ era, individuals 
are increasingly deprived of their symbolic shield, and consequently use 
technology to assuage their anxiety. Today, perversion does not neces-
sarily need sexually explicit content, since technology is everywhere and 
guarantees immediate visibility. However, the general psychic aitude 
remains pornographic (Ěat, self-referential, uerly unable and unwilling 
to transcend itself), whether explicitly or implicitly. 
In light of this reading, the ideal sequel to Auto-focus is no doubt The 
Canyons (2013), which openly displays the dialectical dissolution of subject 
and substance, narrating the death of desire and correlative disappearance 
of humanity as we (still think we) know it. Although the meta-cinematic 
concern is self-evident in practically every scene of the ęlm, what is truly 
at stake here is the self-contraction of modern individuals into zombięed, 
interchangeable fetishes whose machine-like movements are nothing but 
a pale replication of the cold and manipulative microcosm in which they 
live, itself the cipher of the big Other’s vaporisation. The casting of Lindsay 
Lohan (self-destructive celebrity) and James Deen (ex porn actor) carry 
explicit extra-textual evidence, sanctioning the ęlm’s concern with a Real 
that is juxtaposed to a baered and broken-down reality. As always un-
afraid to swan-dive into the sleazy underworld of contemporary degrada-
tion, Schrader and screenwriter Bret Easton Ellis deliver a story of human 
ruins in the age of the radical dissolution of social bonds. The ęlm’s charac-
ters are self-obsessed, cynical, soulless parodies of subjectivity, incapable 
of connecting with one another if not through perverse manipulation and 
empty, funereal sexual rituals. The ęlm’s message is political in the widest 
sense of the word: this, it tells us, is our world; the deluge is here with us, 
although we seem unable to see it. By rejecting all illusions, and obstinate-
ly embracing the senseless core of our epoch, The Canyons captures the 
short-circuiting decadence of our post-Empire world ruled by the naked, 
gargantuan appetite of an economic body quickly turning bulimic. 
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4. Immanent eccentricity
Schrader is particularly aware of the problem of human ęnitude. The 
death-drive of our civilisation, he surmises, should we observed and un-
derstood with a degree of philosophical poise – just like the death-drive 
of cinema:
“I kept returning to Hegel’s insight that the philosophy of Aes-
thetics is the history of Aesthetics. That is, the deęnition, the 
essence of Aesthetics, is nothing more or less than its history. 
The philosophy of Aesthetics equals the mutation of the Aes-
thetic Ideal—understand the mutation, you understand Aes-
thetics. By extension, the philosophy of Religion is the history 
of Religion, and so forth. […] The much-debated ‘end of Art’ 
is not the end of painting and sculpture (they abound), but 
the closing of the plastic arts’ narrative. Life is full of ends; 
species die or become outmoded. There are still horses, but 
the horse’s role in transportation has come to an end. Likewise 
movies. We’re making horseshoes. […] All with beginnings, 
middles, and ends—at an ever-accelerating pace. I agree with 
Kurzweil that humankind is on an evolutionary cusp. We can 
foresee both the end of the 20,000-year reign of Homo sapiens 
and the beginnings of the life-forms that will replace it (some-
thing Kurzweil and Garreau predict will happen in the next 
hundred years). Art looks to the future; it is society’s harbin-
ger. The demise of Art’s human narrative is not a sign of cre-
ative bankruptcy. It’s the twinkling of changes to come. Such 
thoughts ęll me not with despair but envy: I wish I could be 
there to see the curtain rise”.34
Schrader’s futurism, however, should not overshadow his cinema’s 
intrinsic ‘passion’ for the Real dissolution of the value-form. The com-
34 P. Schrader, ‘Canon Fodder‘, p. 34.
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mon denominator of his ęlms is the recording of this process of implo-
sion, which has to do with subjectivity only if intended dialectically as 
inseparable from substance. In this sense these ęlms are precisely “soci-
ety’s harbinger”. 
As anticipated, it would be naive to ignore how impatiently meta-cin-
ematic Schrader’s intentions are. He makes it exceedingly clear, for in-
stance, that Dog Eat Dog is a ęlm about the end of cinema ‘as we know it’, 
brought about by new technologies that destroy and reassemble the old 
rules of ęlmic representation. Irrespective of traditional ęlm continuity, 
almost all sequences here constantly jump across registers and codes, 
scrambling canons, shifting hyperactively between aesthetic perspec-
tives. The schizophrenic dimension of editing includes the constant alter-
nation of slow and fast motion, Tarantino-like ‘pop bloodbaths’, volup-
tuous and melancholic black-and-white, ęrst person narrator noir scenes, 
and even experimentation with multiple endings. It is not accidental that 
for the making of this ęlm he surrounded himself with a young troupe of 
‘post-rules’ technicians.35 On the other hand, we would be twice as naive 
to ignore how the ultimate target of Schrader’s high-octane vision is the 
ęctional fabric of our own social constellation. As a spectacle of self-de-
struction, Dog Eat Dog invites us to reĚect on the irredeemable disinte-
gration of the world sustained by and organised around the increasingly 
unreliable, indeed vanishing, value-form of capital. This collapse invests 
everyone, including the director (Schrader plays ‘El Greco’, the gangster 
who employs the three criminals), the police (depicted as sadistic in the 
35 “We met at a diner every week or so for the summer, and just discussed 
it — those are the heads of my departments, and it was a ęrst credit for all of 
them. They’d come from video games, documentaries, commercials. I didn’t 
want them to think out of the box; I wanted people who were already out of 
the box — didn’t know where the box was! So that’s just how we went about 
it, and it was very invigorating that way. Because I no longer believed in 
the monolithic style, the unięed style. Today, you could shoot diěerent se-
quences diěerent ways, it doesn’t maer anymore. You know, shoot a Cas-
savetes scene, shoot a Godard scene, shoot an Errol Morris scene — put 
them all together” (‘Interview: Paul Schrader on ‘Dog Eat Dog’‘, available 
at hps://ouake.tribecashortlist.com/interview-paul-schrader-on-dog-eat-
dog-a34247db02db [last accessed 24 September 2017].
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scene of Troy’s torturing), and the gun-crazed society (as stressed in the 
TV debate that opens the ęlm) including the black reverend and wife 
kidnapped by Troy in the ęnal scene, since they also have a gun and are 
ready to use it. 
The collapse of the cinematic grammar joyously endorsed in Dog Eat 
Dog is the collapse of the Lacanian big Other of our global society lac-
erated by crisis, which stretches individuality to the point of rupture 
– the independent bourgeois-capitalist individuality as opposed to the 
dependent personhood of pre-capitalist societies. We should not forget 
that in-dividuus means ‘not divisible’ (Latin), in direct equivalence to 
the Greek ‘a-tom’. Modern individualism is synonymous with atomism, 
which translates as social fragmentation and lack of organic cohesion. 
Modernity, insofar as it is sustained by the capitalist mode of produc-
tion, begins with this atom-like concept of the individual, which shaers 
previous organicist forms of social life. Capitalism recognises individ-
uality only if submied to the value-form, only if colonised by value. 
The capitalist mode of production socialises the economic dimension of 
the human being, reducing them unilaterally to what they are able to 
express in terms of economic valorisation. Schrader’s cinema displays 
the paroxistic form of atomistic individuality that captures today’s social 
condition. It follows that an emancipated society should free individual-
ity from the specięc alienation (economic valorisation) imposed by our 
mode of production. 
The question to ask when watching Dog Eat Dog is not whether it 
conforms, or should conform, to shared moral standards, but whether 
it manages to disturb us into perceiving the close link between charac-
ter and social space, or more precisely between the psychopathic struc-
ture of the character’s mind and the dominant form of the social space 
in which he moves. Because of its complex and magmatic language, to 
which many a voice contribute, cinema is endowed with the rare gift 
of anticipating (often unwiingly) the mind’s conscious realisation of a 
given state of aěairs that has to do with the society in which we, viewers, 
are immersed. In this respect, Mad Dog’s rebuke to his accomplice Diesel 
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(“when things begin to rot, they’re at their least toxic for you because 
they are structurally bent on their own self-destruction”) is more sophis-
ticated and worthy of philosophical investigation than we might think: it 
is not merely a maer of emphasising how a roing body is organically 
focussed on accelerating its own self-destruction; this, as we have seen, 
is central to Schrader’s conscious reĚection. What is surprising in Mad 
Dog’s display of scientięc knowledge is the reference to the peripheral 
positioning of the subject who directly witnesses the roing: paradoxi-
cally, that subject is spared the toxicity of the putrefying body. How are 
we to understand this claim? Is it not the claim of a psychopath who fails 
to realise how deeply implicated he is in the consequences of his own 
actions (literally, as he has killed the people in question)? Precisely on 
account of his ‘madness’, Mad Dog is able to appreciate what can only 
appear as absurd or strangely counter-intuitive to someone who is fully 
immersed in his or her symbolic space: he “knows”, in other words, that 
the self-captivation of a collapsing system oěers the subject an unheard 
of chance for redemption, or else for the radical reconęguration of the 
social link itself.
It is this Ěickering hint at redemption, which again takes a meta-cin-
ematic turn in Troy’s (Nicolas Cage) ęnal Humphrey Bogart imper-
sonation, that allows Schrader’s Christian inspiration to illuminate the 
roing fabric of the social bond. It is no surprise that, released into a col-
lapsing society, the three characters choose to rely on either the accentu-
ation of their psychopathic personality traits (Diesel and cocaine-addict 
Mad Dog) or a delusional, solipsistic and nostalgic retreat into old-movie 
suavity (Troy). If the laer no doubt qualięes as poetic license, the former 
should be taken as a metonymic reminder of what I am tempted to call 
the ‘psychopathic turn’ of the contemporary socio-symbolic order hit by 
a devastating, probably terminal valorisation crisis. In this respect, the 
meaning of the term ‘crisis’ is twofold: ęrst, contemporary capitalism’s 
vanishing capacity to generate economic value; second, and contrast-
ingly, its blinding, desensitising dominance as the only legitimate mode 
of social reproduction (the well-known ‘end of History’ scenario). If we 
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read the two deęnitions of crisis together, we get precisely psychopathy 
as the prevailing form of social life, which contemporary cinema is able 
to capture so vividly. Today’s ascendancy of the psychopathic structure 
should be understood as a dialectical ęgure that illuminates the ongoing, 
unstoppable decomposition of the value-form of capital, as well as the 
type of subjectivity that confronts such decomposition through adaptive 
and/or profoundly delusional strategies of denial. 
Schrader’s ęlm would then seem to invoke the coincidence of redemp-
tion and folly, intended as a state of eccentricity through which freedom 
qua substantial negativity may lead to progressing away from an implod-
ing socio-symbolic structure. Here it is worth insisting on the dialectical 
(Hegelian) character of this conęguration: the subject encounters its trau-
matic freedom (to re-invent the dialectical link) in the self-contraction of 
substance. Put diěerently: precisely because substance and subject are 
two sides of the same coin, when substance dissolves, the subject has a 
chance to acknowledge the empty cause of its own social conditioning, 
which on the one hand causes anxiety but on the other can (potentially) 
be liberating. The ęlm’s insistence on subjective over-determination (to 
the point of madness) is indicative of its ultimate message: the only way 
out of the socio-economic predicament in which we languish, and the 
apocalyptic scenario it preęgures, does not reside in denying or mini-
mising its actual impact, or counteracting it by embracing old stances 
and moralistic principles, but rather in acknowledging the paradoxically 
liberating potential of that collapse insofar as it returns the subject to 
its original and grounding inconsistency, which has no alternative but 
to feed the demand for a diěerent (beer) form of socio-symbolic alien-
ation. The vindication of this passage through the empty (and traumatic) 
core of subjectivity does not, of course, amount per se to a viable political 
position vis-à-vis the crisis of contemporary capitalism. However, facing 
the hopelessness of our condition constitutes the indispensable presup-
position for the construction of a political alternative to the status quo 
insofar as it heeds warnings about the true content of a crisis like ours: 
not only that the expiration date of ‘our world’ is fast approaching, but 
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more importantly that coming to terms with the fundamental fragility 
or ęctional inconsistency of our ego, insofar as it is shored up by the val-
ue-form of capital qua receding social substance, is the only rational way 
of avoiding a relapse into barbarism. 
In line with this reading, and returning to Schrader’s ęlm, perhaps 
Mad Dog’s garrulous madness and ęnal demise are more instructive 
than we could possibly think. We should not forget that Diesel ‘wastes’ 
his friend Mad Dog (thus reproducing the ‘dog eat dog’ scenario of the 
title) out of sheer psychological exhaustion, that is to say at the end of 
Mad Dog’s relentless monologue about his aspiration to redeem himself, 
to make a fresh start after a futile life squandered in uer degradation.36
It is the possibility, however highly unlikely, of the clinamen (unpredict-
able swerve, change of direction) voiced by Mad Dog that drives Diesel 
to blow his head away, breaking the oath of mutual support previously 
sanctioned by the trio of thugs. The possibility of this clinamen is the only 
glimmer of ‘liberating’ contingency in the lugubrious hymn to self-de-
struction that pervades Schrader’s determinism. The dialectical struggle 
between necessity (determinism) and contingency is crucial if we are to 
appreciate the critical signięcance of the ęlm, and contemporary cinema 
more generally. For redemptive contingency here is not merely the alter-
36 Whilst driving to the military base with Mike Brennan’s dead body in the 
boot, Mad Dog begins his redemption speech to Diesel, which apart from a 
few action breaks is as follows: “I wanna make a strong action and fuckin’ 
change some things so I could be the person that I know I could be… You’ll 
help me do it, yeah?... You’ll fuckin’ help me untangle my life and make my-
self a person that doesn’t make me fuckin’ wanna throw up every time I pass 
a mirror?... Tomorrow, clean slate. End of all of this shit. So can I just ask you, 
and I want you to be frank ‘cause I really do respect you. I mean, do you think 
people can change? I mean, like, if your behaviour’s one way, that you can, 
like, alter it?... I wanna, you know, sit down, and I want you to give me ęve 
things, ęve character Ěaws that I can do a reboot on. You know, a do-over 
on, amend my character Ěaws, as it were. Like, you know, I mean, just sit 
down and really go with candour, whether it’s my fuckin’ mother’s fault or 
my father’s fault, it doesn’t really maer…. Oh, you know, it doesn’t really 
make any diěerence because I’m willin’ to alter those things because I believe 
in redemption, right? And I’m willin’ to do that.” It is at this that point Diesel 
puts a violent end to his friend’s annoying tirade.
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native to the necessary path of self-destruction followed by our civilisa-
tion. We should not fall into the trap of considering contingency and ne-
cessity as a binary. Rather, following Hegel’s lesson, we should perceive 
them as two dialectical sides of the same coin, whereby contingency is 
always-already inscribed in necessity.
